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INEQUALITY & INSTABILITY* † 
 
George Sayers Bain‡  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
1. Inequality, especially of wealth (value of assets minus liabilities) and income (money received 
in return for services rendered, goods sold, or profits from investments), is currently a hotly 
debated subject not only in the academy but also in society more generally.  This paper gives 
many examples of the academic debate; to take only two examples of the wider discussion:  
Pope Francis wrote his first encyclical against it, and President Obama in his final State of the 
Union Address in 2016 called inequality “the defining challenge of our time”.       
 
2. The protagonists disagree about how inequality should be measured.  But however they 
measure it – whether by Gini coefficients, the share of the total distribution earned by a 
particular group (e.g., the top one per cent), or other ways – they generally agree that 
inequality has greatly increased in a wide range of countries since the mid-1970s.  To take only 
one piece of data from a multitude of statistics, by 2017 the richest 42 individuals in the world 
owned as much private net wealth as the poorer half of humanity, more than 3.7 billion 
people.1    
 
3. Agreement does not exist, however, about what causes inequality, what problems result from 
it, and what might be done to solve them.  This paper attempts to answer these questions by 
reviewing and assessing a diverse literature drawn from economic theory, political science, 
sociology, philosophy, and economic and financial history.  
 
II.  CAUSES 
1. Short-Term Explanations 
 
a) Those who have examined the growth of inequality over the past few decades have 
advanced a variety of factors that might explain it, including: 
 
i. Changing Family Structures:  the growth of poor single-parent families, generally 
supported by low-paid working-mothers at the bottom of the distribution, and 
the growth at the top of “assortative mating”, for example, two university-
graduate households enjoying two large incomes.  
 
ii. Faulty Corporate Governance:  allowing grossly excessive monetary rewards to be 
paid to senior managers, even when they fail to deliver appropriate results.     
 
iii. Tax Dodging:  failing to prevent high-net worth individuals and large corporations 
from paying tax by, for example, using complex tax avoidance schemes and 
sheltering their income and wealth in offshore tax havens.2    
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iv. Technological Change:  favouring highly skilled workers in information 
technology, biotech and medicine, banking and other industries; disadvantaging 
workers particularly in manufacturing and transportation, where artificial 
intelligence is replacing mid-level management jobs and semi-skilled manual jobs 
with robots.3  
 
v. Corporate Market Power:  increasing as industries become more concentrated 
and less competitive, thereby enabling firms to, among other things, raise prices, 
increase profits, and spend more on political lobbying. 
 
vi. Winner-Takes-All Markets:  translating small difference in performance into large 
differences in reward, thereby enabling the best performer(s) to capture a very 
large share of the revenues, while leaving the other competitors with very little 
(e.g., sports, entertainment, and computer software markets). 
 
vii. Developing Capital Markets:  providing massive early-stage finance to scalable 
businesses, particularly in IT, which enables entrepreneurs to monetise equity 
interests at high valuations, thereby allowing them to accumulate great wealth 
based on intellectual property rights and little or no original capital.4 
 
viii. Countervailing Power:  weakening as the membership of various interest groups 
and organisations, such as trade unions in the private sector, declines.   
 
ix. Globalisation:  enabling firms to rapidly export their business models and 
products throughout the world, while at the same time putting employees in high-
salary countries in competition with low-salary employees in the developing 
world.  
 
b) Others – especially Thomas Piketty and Walter Scheidel – have taken much longer-
term views of inequality and, after analysing large quantities of historical evidence, 
have advanced less ad hoc, more coherent, explanations of its dynamics. 
 
2. Long-Term Explanations  
 
a) Piketty, in his book Capital,5 has examined long-term trends in the quantity of capital, 
the return on it, economic growth, and economic inequality, particularly in France and 
Great Britain but also in some other countries (e.g., the USA and Germany).    
 
i. He finds that over the very long-term (i.e., the last two thousand years) the 
rate of return on capital, r, has been greater than g, the growth rate of the 
economy (i.e., r > g), except for most of the twentieth century when g > r.   
Piketty believes this period was exceptional, a historic one-off, because of the 
following factors:  the two world wars and, in some countries, the 
nationalisation of industries greatly reduced the accumulated stock of private 
capital; the wars and the backlash against the market system caused by the 
Great Depression of the 1930s led to radically more progressive tax rates on 
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incomes, assets, and inheritances; and post-war reconstruction after 1945 
caused a rapid increase in the growth of GDP.  
  
ii. From the 1980s, however, economic growth has slowed, while the return on 
capital has begun to rise, primarily because in several countries the market 
system became fashionable again, the financial sector was deregulated, and 
income taxes in the highest brackets were greatly reduced.  Piketty predicts 
that we are now approaching the usual situation for capitalist economies 
where r > g because the owners of capital will continue to save a large 
proportion of their incomes, while the prospects for economic growth are 
poor, not least because of lower demographic growth.     
 
iii. Piketty’s prediction leads him to conclude that since a rentier elite will 
become increasingly rich and exercise disproportionate economic and 
political influence simply by living off its investments, a point will be reached 
where most people will see the economic system as incompatible with 
meritocratic values and social justice, as unfair and a threat to democracy, 
and hence will reject it.  The way to save both capitalism and democracy is, in 
his view, to reduce excessive economic inequalities by raising top marginal 
tax rates on incomes6 and by introducing a progressive wealth tax on assets. 
 
iv. In answering the question of why Piketty’s r > g matters, the Economist gave 
three reasons: “It means, first, that the ratio of an economy’s wealth to its 
output tends to rise, which increases the relative economic power of wealth 
in society.  Second, because the distribution of wealth is usually less equal 
than the distribution of incomes, faster growth in wealth than in GDP means 
a steady increase in inequality.  Third, it implies that income from capital will 
grow as a share of income (and income from labour will fall).  So being born 
rich (or marrying well) becomes a surer route to success than working hard or 
starting a firm.  It is a recipe for social stagnation, and perhaps crisis.”7      
 
v. Much more could be written about Piketty’s monumental work, but it would 
take us too far away from this paper’s focus on inequality and instability.  
Suffice it to note, to quote the Economist again, that “Mr Piketty’s expectation 
of rising wealth concentration is not outlandish.  However, it is a prediction 
based on extrapolation from the past, not an inherent model of capitalism.  
He assumes that the returns to capital will not fall substantially even as the 
stock of wealth rises.  That may prove to be true, but the Piketty prediction is 
a hypothesis, not an iron law.”8  Although Piketty’s prediction is a hypothesis, 
it is based on world-wide data, including Asia where growth is very strong; in 
Western Europe and the USA, growth has dropped to a maximum of two per 
cent per year.  “In this part of the world, as De Grauwe notes, r > g is already 
a fact.”9        
 
b) Scheidel, in his book The Great Leveller,10 takes a wider range of societies and a longer-
term view than Piketty by examining trends in inequality from the Stone Age to the 
present day. 
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i. He finds that the inequality of the past few decades is not exceptional:  for 
thousands of years, inequality within countries has generally been either high 
or rising because of the ways that political and economic power buttress each 
other – power creates wealth and wealth creates power – and both pass 
down the generations. 
 
ii. In short, high or rising inequality is the default option:  it declines only when 
carnage and disaster strike; it increases when peace and stability return.  
More specifically, the great levelling forces, what Scheidel calls the “Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse” – mass mobilisation warfare, transformative 
revolutions, state collapse, and catastrophic plagues – have repeatedly 
destroyed the fortunes of the rich.  When these factors are not present – and 
today they have greatly diminished – inequality is persistent. 
 
3. Rent-Seeking and Marketplace Rules 
 
a) Piketty’s basic findings – stripped of their “iron law” overtones and policy 
prescriptions –  coupled with those of Scheidel – without their undercurrent of history 
“inevitably” repeating itself – can be recast using the economist’s concept of rent-
seeking:  the tendency of powerful elites in society – whether early despots and their 
extended families, feudal kings and their barons, modern capitalists and their 
managers, or others – to seek “rents”:  an excess, undeserved income, which elites 
obtain by erecting barriers to competition and, more generally, by using their power, 
both economic and political, to change in their favour the rules governing how 
markets and the wider economy are organised and operated.11  
  
b) As Robert Reich has argued in his book Saving Capitalism:  For the Many, Not the 
Few,12 these rules do not initially exist in a state of nature free from government 
interference.  “Free” markets exist because governments and their agencies create 
rules that regulate property (what can be owned), monopoly (what degree of market 
power is permissible), contracts (what can be exchanged and under what terms), 
bankruptcy (what happens when purchasers cannot pay), and enforcement (what 
sanctions are applied when someone cheats on any of the rules).   
 
i. Hence the question is not whether there should be government interference 
in markets and the wider economy – the usual debate between the left and 
the right of the political spectrum – but in whose interests should the 
government intervene.  Reich believes that inequality has significantly 
increased over the past few decades because the growing political power of 
corporate and financial elites has enabled them to influence government to 
change the rules by which the economy is run – “market rules that seem to 
apply to everyone and appear to be neutral, but that systematically and 
disproportionately benefit them [p. 10].”  Examples of such intervention 
include cutting top tax rates;13 facilitating company mergers, acquisitions and 
other barriers to competition; and weakening financial regulation.    
 
ii. The consequence has been markets “organized by those with great wealth for 
the purpose of further enhancing their wealth”, resulting “in ever-larger 
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upward pre-distributions inside the market, from the middle class and poor 
to a minority at the top [p. xviii].”  And because these pre-distributions occur 
inside the market, they are largely hidden from view, thereby allowing the 
role of powerful elites in shaping the rules of the marketplace to escape 
scrutiny and challenge. 
 
c) Lindsey and Teles in their book The Captured Economy take the rent-seeking 
argument further by describing its dynamics and linking it to economic growth.14 
 
i. They begin with a paradox.  Economists have generally argued that a tradeoff 
exists between economic equality and economic growth:  if we want more 
growth we must accept greater inequality, because the prospect of greater 
economic rewards encourages individuals to develop new initiatives that 
boost productivity and growth.   
 
ii. But what the USA and some other societies are facing today is a combination 
of slowing growth and rising inequality.15  Lindsey and Teles identify a 
common major factor behind these twin ills:  breakdowns in democratic 
governance that allow wealthy special interests to capture the policymaking 
process for their own benefit – what economists and political scientists call 
“regulatory capture” leading to “regulatory rents”.   
 
iii. Lindsey and Teles document in considerable detail how the proliferation over 
the last four decades of regressive regulatory barriers (e.g., subsidies for the 
financial sector’s excessive risk taking, overprotection of copyrights and 
patents, occupational licensing schemes, and land-use controls) have worked 
to shield the powerful from the rigours of competition, thereby not only 
inflating their incomes, but also stifling and slowing entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and economic growth.  
 
 
III.  PROBLEMS 
1. No Problem, Wrong Problem 
 
a) Some neo-classical economists claim that people’s pay is the natural and inevitable 
consequence of impersonal market forces:  what they are paid is simply a measure of what 
they are worth in the market in which they are selling their labour.  And, according to this 
view, attempts to reduce inequality run the risk of distorting the market, causing it to be 
less efficient and more likely to produce harmful consequences such as unemployment.  
But this claim, usually based on the assumptions of perfect competition, is merely a 
tautology – it is true because of its logical form – and ignores how markets are organised. 
 
b) William Watson does not explicitly make this claim in his book, The Inequality Trap:  
Fighting Capitalism Instead of Poverty,16 but it underpins his basic argument that a 
preoccupation with inequality is an error and a trap.  He believes it is an error because 
inequality can be good, bad, or neutral; it is a trap because it leads us to focus on the top 
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end of the income and wealth distributions, the rich, instead of on policies to help the 
bottom end, the poor, where the bulk of human misery lies.     
   
c) He accepts that “maybe” we can worry about both the top and bottom ends of the 
distributions at the same time.  His uncertainty is unwarranted.  We clearly can concern 
ourselves with two problems at the same time:  a politician or a policy analyst who can’t 
ride two horses at once does not belong in the political or policy circus.  To cite only one 
example, the late Anthony Atkinson, a distinguished British economist, wrote numerous 
books and papers over four decades analysing both inequality and poverty and advancing 
policies to deal with both.17  He concluded that “we have to view our societies as a whole 
and to recognise that there are important interconnections:  economics tends to assume 
away or downplay any interdependency between the economic fortunes of individuals (or 
households)”.  But “we can ask whether countries can achieve low rates of poverty at the 
same time as having high top income shares.”  To answer this question, he examined the 
evidence for fifteen OECD countries and found that only Switzerland has achieved below-
median poverty while having above-median top income shares.  He concluded that 
“higher poverty tends to go together with larger top shares [pp. 24-5].”  
 
d) But Watson has another reason for suggesting that we downplay inequality: “an 
obsession” with inequality is “dangerous” because it “may cause poor and non-poor alike 
to doubt capitalism. an economic system that, in his view, has been largely responsible 
for “our species’ dramatic leave-taking from the more or less perpetually low incomes and 
high death rates, especially among children, that until 1750 or so had been our fate for 
the 5,000 years of our written history and – more than likely, if evidence from 
anthropology and archaeology is admitted – for all our millennia before that [p. xii].”  
Many would agree with Watson that capitalism has brought about a great improvement 
in the human condition over the last two and a half centuries.  Many would also accept, 
however, that capitalism has failed to guarantee sufficient material prosperity for large 
segments of the population and that it generates inequality, often gross inequality.   
 
e) Watson accepts that capitalism produces inequality – “that is how it works” – and that 
inequality is a major factor discrediting modern capitalism and endangering its future (pp.  
xiii, 8).  That is why he is anxious to downplay it and to explain it away.  But the danger 
inequality presents to capitalism is not going to be repulsed by such a strategy.  An 
alternative strategy followed by those like Reich –  whose objective is not to destroy the 
capitalist system but, as the title of his book suggests, to save it – is to recognise the 
system’s merits, but to confront its defects directly and to try to remove or at least to 
mitigate them.  In trying to do so, the constructive critics of capitalism are more likely than 
its bullish cheerleaders to ensure its effective working and survival.  Indeed, those who 
defend an unreformed capitalism are its greatest enemies.18       
   
f) Be that as it may, Watson’s most fundamental reason for downplaying inequality – “What 
do we do about it? . . . not nothing but not much [pp. xiv, 109]” – is that he believes most 
of it can be justified.  He suggests that some inequality is “neutral” (e.g., “assortative 
mating”).19  He grants that the inequality which “occurs when people prosper from 
morally dubious or even illegal actions or from some unfair advantage they have contrived 
for themselves or conspired with others, often through governments, to acquire [p. xiv]” 
is “bad” and should be vigorously prosecuted.  He even goes so far as to accept the need 
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for a “war” – a war that both the left and right of the political spectrum would support – 
on rent-seeking by removing privileges that people and organisations create for 
themselves by acquiring protection and preferences from government.  But, although he 
writes about rent-seeking at some length (pp. xvii-xviii, 145-52, 172, 186-7), unlike Stiglitz, 
Reich, Lindsey and Teles, he does not make rent-seeking central to his analysis and implies 
that a war against it would not significantly or “dramatically” lessen inequality (p. xvii).    
 
g) The reason Watson believes that such a war would not have a dramatic impact is that, in 
his view, most inequality is “good”.  It “occurs when the “economic virtues” – thrift, 
industry, invention, innovation, initiative, and so on – are rewarded.  To support his view, 
Watson devotes a chapter of his book to “The Deserving Rich”, people such as the late 
Steve Jobs of Apple.20  In contrast, Reich devotes one chapter of his book to “The Rise of 
the Non-working Rich” and another to “The Rise of the Working Poor”.  Ad hoc, debatable 
examples of the deserving and undeserving could no doubt be produced ad infinitum.  
More telling is Wolff’s point that in the USA “there is direct survey evidence that 
intergenerational transfer of wealth may explain upwards of 40 percent of the total 
household lifetime accumulation of wealth. . .. If this is the case, we are led to the rather 
bleak conclusion that the United States is not a land of equal opportunity for all but rather 
one in which social class plays a very important role.”21  And Wolff’s evidence dates from 
before the baby-boom generation has died off, which when it occurs will bring about an 
even greater transfer of intergenerational wealth.22  Whatever the merits of this transfer, 
the recipients can hardly be described as “the deserving rich”. 
 
h) Clearly, however, some inequality – perhaps even a good deal of it – does arise from 
rewarding the “economic virtues”.23  But does most inequality arise in this way?  And has 
most of the significant increase in inequality over the past few decades arisen in this way?  
For example, the compensation of CEOs in American large corporations relative to the pay 
of average workers has increased from a ratio of 20 to 1 in 1965, to 30 to 1 in 1978, 123 
to 1 in 1995, and over 300 to 1 in 2015.24  Has this soaring compensation resulted from 
CEOs having become dramatically more thrifty, industrious, inventive, innovative, 
initiative-taking, and so on?  The available evidence suggests not.    Lindsey and Teles 
present evidence that indicates Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”, the ongoing 
displacement of old firms and existing ways of doing things by new firms and new ideas, 
and other indices of business dynamism are declining.  They also present evidence of a 
rise in rents across the American economy.25  Hence a more likely reason for the dramatic 
rise in the compensation of CEOs is their increasing power to influence the rules that 
regulate the operation of markets.  An additional reason is faulty corporate governance 
that, as a City of London grandee recently claimed, has allowed capitalism to be “hijacked 
by the management class”, with the rewards of owner-entrepreneurs made available to 
mere managers.26 
 
i) To summarise, inequality, and its increase in recent decades, have much less to do with 
justified returns to the “economic virtues” and much more to do, as most of the authors 
cited above have argued, with large corporations and wealthy individuals obtaining rents 
by, in Reich’s words, “gaining power over market rules that generate outcomes favouring 
them – power that has been compounded as the additional wealth has accorded them 
even more influence over the rules [p. 157]” – and, indeed, wealth and power that is 
passed on to future generations.  In reaching this conclusion, they are in the tradition of 
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Adam Smith, regarded by many as the father of capitalism, who pointed out in 1776 in 
The Wealth of Nations that “consumption is the sole end and purpose of production; and 
the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for 
promoting that of the consumer”, but who went on to observe that “people of the same 
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends 
in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 
 
j) Hence those who wish to achieve market efficiency and maximise consumer welfare, the 
supposed benefits of capitalism, should be greatly concerned about high and increasing 
economic inequality.  Another reason they should be concerned is that however inequality 
is generated, and even if it is “good” or “neutral”, it can have unintended negative 
consequences and “externalities” for society.  It can, among other things, be unfair, lessen 
societal well-being, and create economic, social and political instability – an array of 
undesirable consequences that need to be addressed.27 
 
2. Fairness 
 
a) The most fundamental problem presented by gross inequalities of income and wealth 
is that they are unfair, and hence lack social legitimacy. 
 
i. Rawls in his Theory of Justice,28 a work that has greatly influenced modern 
political philosophy and ethics, holds that a democratic society is in some 
sense an agreement among all those within it to co-operate for mutual 
advantage.  And he asks how rational persons would choose to organise that 
society if they were behind a “veil of ignorance”:  that is, if they did not know 
what natural abilities they had or what place they would occupy in the 
society being formed.       
 
ii. His answer to this question is that they would choose a social structure – 
including a set of rules to distribute the economic surplus generated by that 
society – which would maximise their welfare if they happened to end up in 
the least desirable position.   
iii. Even among those who accept Rawls’ veil-of-ignorance methodology and his 
idea that the methodology supports the maximin (i.e., maximise the 
minimum) principle, room still exists for debate about which distributions 
are achievable and hence about which satisfy his principle.29  But it is very 
hard to believe that, of all the achievable distributions of income and wealth, 
the massively unequal distributions typical of many societies today maximise 
the position of those at the bottom.  To accept that you would have to 
demonstrate that any attempt to redistribute, even moderately, would fail –  
perhaps because of its negative effects on incentives and productivity –   
which is most unlikely.   
b) Rawls’ work initiated a wide-ranging debate about the nature of social justice and, 
among other things, the connection between economic inequality and equality of 
opportunity. 
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i. Following the work of Roemer,30 economists now tend to separate the 
determinants of economic outcomes into those resulting from 
“circumstances” that are beyond personal control (e.g., family background 
and upbringing, race and ethnicity, age, and gender) and “effort”, for which 
an individual can be held responsible (e.g., the intensity of application in 
achieving a task).  Equality of opportunity is achieved when “circumstances” 
do not play any role in the resulting outcome. 
 
ii. But full equality of opportunity is impossible to achieve.  Some people are 
simply better placed to take advantage of opportunity because of, for 
example, family upbringing.  Dinish D’Souza, a political commentator and film 
maker, has described how he and his wife’s parenting of their daughter 
undermines equality of opportunity: “My wife goes over her workbooks.  I am 
teaching her chess.  Why are we doing these things?  We are, of course, trying 
to develop her abilities so that she can get the most out of life.  The practical 
effect of our actions, however, is that we are working to give our daughter an 
edge – that is, a better chance to succeed than everybody else’s children.”31  
Many, particularly aspiring middle-class, parents – regardless of their political 
and ethical views – do the same for their children, and some go much further 
by sending their children to private schools and private tutors.  
 
iii. Trying to eliminate all differences in parenting would be undesirable and, in 
any case, impossible.  Paul Krugman, a Nobel economics laureate who 
generally follows the Rawlsian approach, accepts “life is unfair, and that 
there’s only so much you can do about that at the starting line”.32  He is right.  
Leaving aside that between a third and a half of our talents are determined at 
birth,33 differences in parenting, to stay with the same example, mean that 
not everyone has the same starting point in life.  Equitable, as distinct from 
equal, treatment would try to promote fairness by providing extra help and 
resources to those who start further behind.  Doing so would mitigate some 
of the unfairness, but it would not produce full equality of opportunity:  giving 
everyone the same starting point in their journey through life and the same 
chance of obtaining the same outcomes. Since many of the worst-off would 
have done better with full equality of opportunity, a society aiming for greater 
fairness needs to introduce policies designed to bring the outcomes of the 
disadvantaged closer to what they would have been if such equality had been 
achievable.    
 
iv. Atkinson takes this point a step further by linking tomorrow’s equality of 
opportunity with today’s equality of outcome.  “Concern about unequal 
opportunity, and about limited social mobility, has intensified as the 
distributions of income and wealth have become more unequal.  This is 
because the impact of family background on outcome depends both on the 
strength of the relationship between background and outcome and on the 
extent of inequality among family backgrounds.  Inequality of outcome 
among today’s generation is the source of the unfair advantage received by 
the next generation.  If we are concerned about equality of opportunity 
tomorrow, we need to be concerned about inequality of outcome today.”34 
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v. The reason the United Kingdom and, despite its myth of mobility, the United 
States are the least socially mobile countries in the developed world is that 
they are also the most unequal.  Moreover, as Goldthorpe has shown for the 
UK, the rates of relative social mobility, which compare the chances of 
individuals of differing class origins arriving at different class destinations and 
thus indicate the extent of social fluidity, have not changed for a century:  
today, a British boy born middle class is fifteen times more likely to end up 
middle class than a boy born into the working class, odds that are the same 
as they were a century ago.35  Similar data do not seem to exist for the USA 
and other countries but, as Corak and others have demonstrated, countries 
with more inequality at one point in time also experience less earnings 
mobility across generations, a relationship that has been called the “Great 
Gatsby Curve”.36              
 
3. Societal Well-Being 
 
a) Two epidemiologists, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, in their book The Spirit 
Level:  Why Equality Is Better for Everyone,37 provide a great deal of empirical evidence 
to demonstrate that social well-being – a wide range of social factors including life 
expectancy, physical and mental illness, crime and illiteracy, educational 
performance, and social trust – are generally worse the more unequal the societies.   
 
b) They also demonstrate that more unequal societies are dysfunctional not only for the 
poor but also for the well off.  “As John Donne said, ‘No man is an Island’ even from 
the effects of inequality. . .. What the studies do make clear . . . is that greater equality 
brings substantial gains even in the top occupational class and among the richest or 
best-educated quarter or third of the population . . . In short, . . . the benefits of 
greater equality seem to be shared across the vast majority of the population [p. 
181].”   
 
c) The dysfunctional aspects of inequality are one of the factors that led the philosopher 
Michael J. Sandel to argue that markets have moral limits and that market economies 
should not become market societies.38 
 
4. Economic Instability 
 
a) Economic inequality can also encourage economic instability by increasing the 
competitive pressure to consume.  As inequality grows and the rich spend more and 
more on status or luxury goods – what Thorstein Veblen in his Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1899) called “conspicuous consumption” – the desire for such things, 
encouraged by advertising, cascades down to those on lower incomes who struggle 
to keep up – what Frank calls “luxury fever”.39   
 
b) The latest example of this fever occurred in the USA.  The inequality of per capita 
household wealth there increased greatly over the last four decades.  During this 
period, as Wolff shows, almost the entire growth in household wealth accrued to the 
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richest 20 per cent of households and almost two-thirds to the richest 1 per cent 
alone.40    
 
c) Not surprisingly, gross consumption increased rapidly.  With those at the top of the 
wealth and income distributions setting the pace, those lower down spent wildly in 
an attempt not to fall behind and thereby maintain their relative status.  Spending 
beyond their means, the household debt of the middle classes more than doubled 
from 67 to 157 per cent of their income, and their ratio of debt to net worth climbed 
from 37 to 61 per cent.41  The debt was mainly secured by home mortgages – many 
of them “sub-prime” or lower quality – and when rapidly rising house prices crashed 
in 2007, it helped to precipitate the Great Recession.  
 
d) Although Ray Dalio, the head of Bridgewater, one of the world’s most successful 
hedge funds, forecast the end of the housing boom, the collapse of the banks, and the 
implosion of credit markets in the Great Recession of 2007-08, he is today worried 
about inequality for political rather than economic reasons.  He believes that the 
increase in inequality in the United States has been so great that it has created 
“multiple economies”:  the elite live in an expanding economy, but “for the bottom 
60 to 80 per cent, there is a depressed economy that is not growing well”.  He thinks 
this inequality is creating so much strife that it will be political conflict – not economics 
– that drives markets in 2018 and beyond.  What investors should now watch is not 
just the next statement from the Federal Bank, but “the next election in France or in 
the UK, or how hospitable will Jeremy Corbyn be to capital?”42 
 
5. Social & Political Instability 
 
a) As Dalio’s remarks suggest, inequality has social and political as well as economic 
consequences.  Citizens will tolerate economic reversals, uncertainty and unfairness 
for a time, sometimes a long time, if they trust that the system governing them will 
eventually change and ultimately produce a better outcome.  But persistent, massive 
inequality promotes a feeling among the underclass that the system and the type of 
people who control it are self-interested and are not going to change; it corrodes that 
trust – trust that is necessary for the effective working of an intertwined economic, 
social and political system.  As Confucius told his disciple Tsze-kung, three things are 
needed for government:  weapons, food, and trust.  If a ruler can’t hold on to all three, 
he should give up the weapons first, and the food next.  Trust should be guarded to 
the end: “without trust we cannot stand”.43 
 
b) The corrosion of trust resulting from massive inequalities is currently leading to social 
and political instability that is lessening societal well-being, reducing market 
effectiveness and citizen’s confidence in the economic system, and generating 
extreme divisions and populist demagoguery that is undermining the inclusivity and 
cohesion of democratic societies.44  The election of Donald Trump in the United States 
and Brexit in the United Kingdom are examples of what happens when trust is 
withdrawn.  So, too, to take another British example, is the take-over of the Labour 
Party, which has historically owed more to Methodism than to Marxism, by the far 
left – a well-organised group of Marxists led by Jeremy Corbyn – that is now Her 
Majesty’s Official Opposition and will perhaps soon be her next government.  This 
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prospect led a senior official of Morgan Stanley to tell clients in 2017 that “we could 
see the biggest shake-up in the political backdrop since the 70s”, which “is much 
[scarier] from an equity perspective than Brexit”.  Mr Corbyn agreed with him, 
replying that those in the financial sector were “speculators and gamblers who 
crashed our economy”, and warning banks operating in the City of London that he 
would be a threat to their business – “a threat to a damaging and failed system that’s 
rigged for the few” – if he became prime minister.45 
 
c) Examples from Continental Europe include nationalist governments in Hungary and 
Poland threatening the rule of law; and parties of the extreme left or right returning 
record election results in Italy, Austria, Greece, and Germany; indeed, following the 
German elections in September 2017, the far-right, populist Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) became the third largest party, entered the Bundestag for the first time, and 
became the official opposition.46          
 
d) More generally, a “trust barometer” produced in 2017 by Edelman, a PR agency, 
showed an “unprecedented crisis of trust” across the Western world, not only in 
politics, but also in most public institutions, the media and charities.47 
 
e) This corrosion of trust is causing business leaders in Britain and some other European 
countries, and even in the United States,48 to criticise the state of modern capitalism, 
and to admit that anti-competitive practices, management greed, corporate tax 
dodging, investor short-termism, and other faults have broken, to quote an editorial 
in the Financial Times, “the underlying promise of western capitalist economies – that 
a rising tide lifts all boats”.  The editorial went on to note that “there are plenty of 
ways to reform the capitalist system without tearing it up. . . Any significant change 
will be painful.  But if capitalism’s defenders continue to fight reform while lamenting 
the state of affairs, they may soon face a more unpleasant reckoning.”49 
 
f) Martin Wolf, the respected Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator of the 
Financial Times, believes that one possible reckoning “is the sort of ‘plutocratic 
populism’ that has become such a feature of the US . . . The future could then consist 
of a stable plutocracy, which manages to keep the mass of the people divided and 
docile.  The alternative might be the emergence of a dictator, who rides to power on 
the back of a faux opposition to just such elites.”50  Such “dark scenarios” are in the 
general interest of neither the underclass at the bottom nor the elites at the top of 
democratic societies.  Nor are they in the interest of those who wish to preserve 
democracy and capitalism.  
 
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
1. Multiple Solutions 
 
a) Numerous solutions have been suggested for making societies more equal.  Atkinson, 
for example, has advanced policies ranging from directing technological change to 
increase the employability of workers, through making taxation more progressive and 
social benefits more generous, to broadening capital ownership by promoting greater 
saving and investment by ordinary citizens.51 
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b) Reich would not necessarily oppose these policies but believes that the emphasis 
should be on making taxes and transfer payments less necessary by changing the rules 
of the marketplace so that they lessen upward pre-distribution inside markets by, for 
example:  weakening the nature and shortening the length of patent protection, 
strengthening anti-competition legislation, and raising the standards of corporate 
governance.  “The pertinent issue is not how much is to be taxed away from the 
wealthy and redistributed to those who are not; it is how to design the rules of the 
market so that the economy generates what most people would consider a fair 
distribution on its own, without necessitating large redistributions after the fact [p. 
219].” 
 
2. Political Will 
 
a) Hence the challenge for those wishing to reduce inequality is not a shortage of 
appropriate solutions – there are hundreds of them52 – but a lack of political will to 
implement them.  Reich is optimistic that the majority of a nation’s citizens could 
acquire sufficient “countervailing power” to have government alter the rules of the 
market so they more closely meet their needs.  
 
b) Lindsey and Teles are also optimistic that, at least in the United States, rent-seeking 
can be significantly reduced by a more “deliberative politics” that would increase 
democracy’s deliberative capacity to resist claims by the powerful for special 
legislative favours.   Such capacity would be increased by, among other things, 
bringing these claims into the open and subjecting them to vigorous scrutiny – 
scrutiny that combines “the best of the two liberal traditions of the left and right into 
a liberalism” that creates “a state strong enough to support a capitalist economy, but 
one made less susceptible to exploitation by the powerful [p. 13].”   
 
c) But the developments Reich, Lindsey and Teles believe are necessary to produce more  
“countervailing power” and more “deliberative politics” – first, for most citizens to 
come to recognise the benefits of greater equality and the ways the rules of the 
marketplace can be manipulated to frustrate its achievement; and, second, for them 
to become sufficiently organised and unified to bring about political change, which 
might involve political realignment and even the development of new political parties 
– indicate that acquiring the necessary power would be difficult.53    
 
d) And even if the citizens of particular nations did acquire the necessary power, 
Scheidel’s analysis of the long-term persistence of inequality, except in periods of 
social catastrophe and upheaval, implies that the exercise of this power might 
produce only marginal change rather than the significant change that Reich, Lindsey 
and Teles want.  Significant change might also be frustrated by globalisation:  national 
democracies cannot regulate and control transnational markets.   
 
e) But the past does not necessarily determine the future; choice does exist.  The degree 
of inequality varies considerably by country.54  Today, the United States is the most 
inegalitarian country among the advanced industrialised countries of the world, 
whereas the Nordic countries are among the least.  The latter have chosen to 
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introduce policies that have brought about much more equitable distributions of 
income and wealth.  Other countries could introduce similar policies if they believed 
their degree of inequality was too high, and if they had the political will to reduce it.   
 
f) If the political will does not exist, however, Marxist dreams of those at the bottom of 
income and wealth distributions rising violently in revolt against those at the top are 
unlikely, at least in Western democracies, to be fulfilled.  Marx developed a linear 
theory of the rise and fall of capitalism – a theory predicting that capitalism would 
disappear and be replaced permanently by some form of state control over the 
economy.  De Grauwe, in contrast, has developed a cyclical theory predicting that 
capitalism is subject to a rise and fall followed by a resurrection, which in turn leads 
to a new rise and fall, ad infinitum.  He argues that capitalism has not developed as a 
“pure” market system:  it is a mixture of market and government control, and both 
have their limits because of differences between individual and collective rationality, 
with the result that “the history of the past 200 years is one of large pendulum swings 
in the scope of markets and governments.”55  To take the last century, in the 1920s 
market control was the more important factor; from the 1930s government control 
increased and in the period 1945-80 played the greater role; since 1980 market 
control has dominated.   
 
g) Over the last few years, experience in several countries indicates that market control 
is reaching its limits and government control is becoming more important.  Whether 
greater government control will lead to greater economic equality, however, is an 
open question.  De Grauwe argues that democracy safeguards capitalism: 
“democratic institutions bring stability” to capitalism by identifying collective 
interests quickly and giving them a voice that “forces politicians to promote collective 
interests instead of the individual interests of the rich and influential” (p. 78).  But, as 
Massie has pointed out, “we too easily forget that democracy is a recent development 
in much of Europe.  It is barely 25 years old in the east and only in early middle age 
across much of the Mediterranean.”  He goes on to cite results from various surveys 
showing that 20 per cent of Spanish and Greek citizens think representative 
democracy is a bad way of governing their countries, and 29 per cent of Italian voters 
approve of government in which “a strong leader can make decisions without 
interference from parliament or the courts”.  Weak support for democracy also exists 
across the Channel and across the Atlantic:  almost 40 per cent of British millennials 
no longer think democracy is vital, and only 30 per cent of American millennials 
believe it is “essential” to live in a democracy compared with 75 per cent of those 
born in the 1930s.56  
 
h) Hence, even if the tide of neo-liberal economics continues to ebb and the pendulum 
in the mixed economy of capitalism continues to swing from less control by markets 
to more control by governments, governments will not necessarily introduce policies 
to reduce excessive inequalities.  They will do so only if democratic institutions are 
strong enough to ensure that the interests of those at the top of societies will not 
trump those of the citizens who are below them.  And whether these institutions will 
be strong enough is a question only the future can accurately answer. 
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